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EX ANTE UP: COMBATTING PROBLEM
GAMBLING AND ITS HARMS IN JAPAN
AHEAD OF THE LEGALIZATION OF
CASINOS
Verin W. Valdez*
INTRODUCTION
Modern nations across the globe—including the United States, Australia,
China, and Singapore—permit casino gambling in some form, but in Japan
gambling remains a crime under Chapter XXIII of Penal Code Act No. 45 of
1907.1 Specifically, Chapter XXIII punishes any person engaged in the
following acts: gambling, habitual gambling, and operating a place for
gambling, or organizing a group of habitual gamblers for profit.2 This provision
implicitly outlaws any casino or other type of gambling hall.3 Chapter XXIII
also penalizes any person involved in the sale, delivery, or receipt of lottery
tickets; however, betting on horse racing, bicycles, and speedboats is legal.4
In April 2010, Japanese lawmakers began promoting legislation that would
permit the establishment of casinos in Japan.5 Lawmakers primarily sought to
boost the economy in Japan, which had been waning and continues to stagnate.6

*
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1
See KEIHŌ [KEIHŌ] [PEN. C.] 1907, art. 185–87 (Japan); see also Kenji Saito &
Norika Yuasa, Gaming Law: Consideration of Japanese Gaming Law, IFLR.COM
(Apr. 1, 2012), http://www.iflr.com/Article/3007248/ Gaming-law-Considerationof-Japanese-Gaming-Law.html.
2
See KEIHŌ [KEIHŌ] [PEN. C.] 1907, art. 185–86 (Japan).
3
See id. at art. 186.
4
See id. at art. 187; see also Kyla Ryan, Casinos and Japan’s Gambling
Addiction, THE DIPLOMAT (Sept. 23, 2014), http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/
casinos-and-japans-gambling-addiction.
5
See Saito & Yuasa, supra note 1.
6
See Euan McKirdy, Is Japan Betting Big on the Legalization of Casinos?,
CNN.COM (May 15, 2014, 1:57 AM), http://edition.cnn.com/2014/05/14/
world/asia/japan-casinos/index.html.

85

VALDEZ FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

86

UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL

5/30/17 2:23 PM

[Vol. 7:85

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his Liberal Democratic Party continue
to be proponents of the legalization of gambling as part of the Prime Minister’s
economic plan, popularly deemed “Abenomics.”7 The Japanese economy
initially saw positive results out of Abenomics, but there has been no real
growth in Japan’s gross domestic product since 2009.8
These proponents assert that legal gambling will increase tourism and will
result in annual Japan gaming revenue totaling as much as $40 billion by 2025.9
Lawmakers have not yet proposed a tax structure, but they have stated that the
tax rate will not be as low as Singapore (12.5–22.5%) and not as high as Macau
(35–39%), which will mean a sizable tax income for Japan.10 Aside from taxes,
this estimated gaming revenue would make Japan the second largest gambling
market in Asia, right behind Macau.11 Foreign international casino firms, such
as Wynn Resorts, Las Vegas Sands, MGM Resorts, and Melco Crown
Entertainment, have been eager to invest billions of dollars in Japan to expand
their international presence—just as many have successfully done in Macau
and Singapore.12
See Stephen Harner, Abenomics Leading to Crisis? Post-’Collective Security,’
With Support Plunging, Abe Gambles On Casinos, FORBES.COM (July 27, 2014,
4:41 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenharner/2014/ 07/27/abenomicsleading-to-crisis-post-collective-security-with-support-plunging-abe-gambles-oncasinos.
8
See Chen Zhao, Abenomics Won’t Work. And That’s Ok., BLOOMBERG VIEW
(Aug. 11, 2016, 5:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/ 2016-0811/abenomics-won-t-work-and-that-s-ok; see also Muhammad Cohen, Japan
Forms Casino Task Force to Boost Flagging Momentum, FORBES.COM (Aug. 25,
2014, 1:57 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ muhammadcohen/2014/08/25/japanforms-casino-task-force-to-boost-flagging-momentum.
9
See Brian Fowler & Isabel Reynolds, Abe Says LDP Aiming to Pass Japan’s
Casino Law in Autumn, BLOOMBERG (Jun. 25, 2014, 1:51 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-24/abe-says-ldp-aiming-to-pass-japancasino-legislation-in-autumn.html.
10
See Cohen, supra note 8; see also Dominic B. Silva, The Great International
Expansion of Gaming, VALUELINE.COM (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.valueline.com/
Stocks/Commentaries/The_Great_International_Expansion_of_Gaming.aspx.
11
See Fowler & Reynolds, supra note 9.
12
In fact, the Japanese market is so appealing that LVS is prepared to make a $10
billion investment and has already begun opening offices and hiring employees in
Japan. Sheldon Adelson, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of LVS, said at a
media event in Japan, “We will spend whatever it takes.” In 2013, Bill Hornbuckle,
President of MGM Resorts, said it would invest “several” billion dollars, and
Gamal Aziz, Development Chief Operating Officer of Wynn Resorts, said it would
invest much more than $4 billion dollars, which is the amount it spent in Macau.
See Ritsuko Ando, Costs, Politics Erode Chances for a Tokyo Casino by 2020,
REUTERS (Sept. 29, 2014, 12:35 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/
09/29/us-japan-gambling-tokyo-idUSKCN0HO09F20140929; see also Jonathan
DeHart, Casinos in Tokyo: An Olympic-Sized Cash Cow?, THE DIPLOMAT (Sept.
30, 2013), http://thediplomat.com/2013/09/casinos-in-tokyo-an-olympic-sizedcash- cow; see also Jacob Adelman, Yuki Yamaguchi & Vinicy Chan, Las Vegas
Sands Ready to Invest $10 Billion in Japan Casino, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 24, 2014,
7
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In August 2011, legalization proponents announced the Draft Act
Regarding the Promotion of the Development of Integrated Resort Areas
(“Draft Act”).13 The Draft Act concerns the development of a government
system that will allow for the creation of Integrated Resorts (“IR”).14 IRs are
privately operated establishments that integrate casinos and other facilities that
contribute to the promotion of tourism.15 The goal is to ensure that Integrated
Resort Areas, which are government-approved areas permitting the location of
IRs, become successful tourist destinations that are internationally competitive,
benefit local economies, and generate tax revenues.16 Two to three major cities
in Japan, such as Tokyo and Osaka, are likely to establish Integrated Resort
Areas first, with smaller and more remote cities to follow.17
Supporters hoped the National Diet, the Japanese national legislature,
would pass the Draft Act by the end of 2014 in order to start the process and
reach the goal of having functional IRs before Japan hosts the 2020 Olympics
in Tokyo.18 In December 2013, lawmakers introduced the Draft Act into the
Diet, but it did not come to a vote before the sessions ended in 2014 due to the
lack of deliberation time.19 In subsequent sessions, supporters abandoned the
pursuit of passing the Draft Act; however, the July 2016 elections gave
majority control over the Diet to the Liberal Democratic Party and thus, the
ability to pass almost any legislation it desires without the support of any other
party.20 While the proposition of legalizing gambling is not new in Japan, given

12:30 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-24/las-vegas-sands-readyto-invest-10-billion-in-japan-casino.html.
13
See Saito & Yuasa, supra note 1; see generally Sōgō rizōto no kaihatsu no
suishin ni kansuru hōan [Draft Act Regarding the Promotion of the Development of
Integrated Resort Areas], 185 SEITI HŌRITSU 29 (Japan) [hereinafter Draft Act]; see
also Masahiro Shiga & Dale Caldwell, Japan’s National Diet Considers Casino
Legislation, MOFO.COM (Feb. 2014), http://media.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/
1402-Japan-Natural-Diet-Casino-Legislation.pdf.
14
See Draft Act, supra note 13, art. 2.1; see also Shiga & Caldwell, supra note 13,
at 1.
15
See Draft Act, supra note 13, art. 2.1; see also Shiga & Caldwell, supra note 13,
at 2.
16
See Draft Act, supra note 13, art. 1, 2.2, 3, 6, 7; see also Shiga & Caldwell,
supra note 13, at 1–2.
17
See Isabel Reynolds & Maiko Takahashi, Japan Casino Bill Set to Pass Next
Month, Lawmaker Says, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 30, 2014, 12:38 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-09-30/japan-casino-bill-set-to-pass-nextmonth-lawmaker-says.html; see also Shiga & Caldwell, supra note 13, at 1.
18
See Reynolds & Takahashi, supra note 17.
19
See Shiga & Caldwell, supra note 13, at 1; Japan Ruling Coalition Shelves
Casino Enabling Bill Vote, GGRASIA.COM (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.ggrasia.
com/japans-ruling-parties-shelve-vote-on-casino-enabling-bill.
20
See Eric Johnston, Diet May Take Up Gambling Bill Again, but Odds Are Low
Japan Will See Casinos by 2020, THE JAPAN TIMES (Feb. 19, 2015),
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/02/19/national/diet-may-take-upgambling-bill-again-but-odds-are-low-japan-will-see-casinos-by-2020; see also
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its socially conservative politics, this is the closest it has come to fruition.21
However, the future of the Draft Act is still unknown, and it is unclear if the
Olympic goal is still attainable.
Clearly, the main legal issue of the Draft Act is the casino portion of the
IR. While the Draft Act’s passage will not make gambling legal, it will pave the
way for further legislation within one year, effectively lifting the current ban on
gambling.22 Opponent groups have fought against the legalization of gambling
for years, claiming that it would produce organized crime, money laundering,
and gambling addiction.23 The Draft Act certainly reflects these concerns, as in
Article 10 “Regulations on Establishment and Operation of Casino Facilities,”
which vaguely states that the national government shall address certain matters
like crime prevention, advertisement regulations, protection of minors, and
adverse effects on visitors of casino facilities.24 The goal for these measures is
to prevent improper acts at casino facilities within IRs, and to eliminate other
adverse effects that may result therefrom.25
To combat problem gambling and other social harms derived from
gambling in Japan, lawmakers will have to decide which regulations to enact
before establishing IRs. Regulations enacted ex ante raise issues including (1)
whether regulation will, as desired, forestall problem gambling and gambling
disorder amongst Japanese citizens and residents; (2) whether regulation will
adversely affect the economic potential of casinos by limiting the local market;
and (3) whether problem gambling will even be a statistically significant
problem. Ultimately, Japan will have to decide whether to address potential
problem gambling with regulations on an ex ante basis or ex post basis.
This Article seeks to provide guidance to the Diet by exploring how the
legislatures of the world’s top gaming markets have addressed similar issues.
The Article first provides brief histories of the legalization of casino gambling
in Macau, Las Vegas, and Singapore. This Article then compares each market
and provides a recommendation to the Diet regarding the following regulations:
(1) entry levies, (2) age restrictions, (3) regulation of extension of gambling
credit, and (4) exclusion.

Jasmine Solana, Casino Legislation Back on the Table as Japan’s LDP Holds
Outright Majority, CALVINAYRE.COM (July 28, 2016), http://calvinayre.com/2016/
07/28/casino/casino-legislation-back-on-the-table-as-japans-ldp-holds-outrightmajority.
21
See Harner, supra note 7.
22
See Draft Act, supra note 13, art. 5; see also Shiga & Caldwell, supra note 13,
at 1.
23
See Reynolds & Takahashi, supra note 17.
24
See Draft Act, supra note 13, art. 10(4), (6)–(8); see also Shiga & Caldwell,
supra note 13, at 3.
25
See Draft Act, supra note 13, art. 10; see also Shiga & Caldwell, supra note 13,
at 3.
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I. BRIEF CASE STUDIES ON THE LEGALIZATION OF GAMBLING
The top gaming markets in the world by annual revenue are Macau, Las
Vegas, and Singapore, in descending order. Macau remains the largest casino
gaming market, with annual revenues of USD $29 billion in 2015—close to
two and six times the 2015 revenues of Las Vegas and Singapore,
respectively.26 Las Vegas is the second largest gaming market with annual
revenues of about $15 billion in 2015.27 Singapore is the third largest gaming
market with annual revenues of almost USD $5 billion in 2015.28
Interestingly, these three markets have legalized gambling and casino
gaming differently, especially in terms of time and approach. However, they
each faced changing governments and economic conditions that played roles in
the legalization process. The present contemplation of legalization in Japan is
comparable to that of these markets in the past. These histories provide a
background to the markets’ current regulatory schemes and what could be the
regulatory schemes of Japan in the near future.
A. Macau
Macau is a city located on a small piece of land measuring about 10 square
miles on the southwestern coast of China along the South China Sea, and about
an hour west of Hong Kong by ferry.29
For 440 years, Portugal retained Macau as a colony, and legalized
gambling in the colony in 1847.30 On December 20, 1999, Portugal returned
Macau to China, which designated the territory a Special Administrative
Region of China.31 As a Special Administrative Region, under the “one
country, two systems” framework of China, Macau maintains more social and
economic autonomy than other areas of China.32 As such, gambling remained
legal in Macau upon its return to China and remains illegal in all other parts of

See Monthly Gross Revenue from Games of Fortune, GAMING INSPECTION &
COORDINATION BUREAU (2015), http://www.dicj.gov. mo/web/en/information/
DadosEstat_mensal/2015/index.html; see also NEV. GAMING CONTROL BOARD,
GAMING REVENUE REPORT A-01 (2016), http://gaming.nv.gov/modules/
showdocument.aspx?documentid=10810; Singapore Casino Revenue Expected to
Decline in 2016, YOGONET.COM (Apr. 1, 2016), http://www.yogonet.com/
international/2016/ 01/04/singapore-casino-revenue-expected-to-decline-in-2016.
27
See NEV. GAMING CONTROL BOARD, supra note 26.
28
See YOGONET.COM, supra note 26.
29
See Davis Ka-Chio Fong & Bernadete Ozorio, Gambling Participation and
Prevalence Estimates of Pathological Gambling in a Far-East Gambling City:
Macao, 9 UNLV GAMING RESEARCH & REV. J. 15, 15 (2005).
30
See id.; see also Macao Gaming History, GAMING INSPECTION &
COORDINATION BUREAU, http://www.dicj.gov.mo/web/en/history/ index.html.
31
See Macao Gaming History, supra note 30.
32
See Fong & Ozorio, supra note 29.
26
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the country.33
Between 1962 and 2001, a company named Sociedade de Turismo e
Diversões de Macao (“STDM”) maintained a monopoly concession on casinos
given to it by the colonial government.34 When this monopoly concession
expired, the new government allowed outside investors to bid multiple
concessions.35 The government abandoned the monopoly model, citing
concerns about STDM’s control over the government, lack of improvements to
the gaming facilities, gambling-related crime, and the return of Macau to
China.36 A subsidiary of STDM named Sociedade de Jogos de Macau (“SJM”),
Wynn Resorts, and Galaxy Entertainment each won a concession.37 The new
framework also permitted SJM, Wynn Resorts, and Galaxy Entertainment to
sell sub-concessions, which they did to Las Vegas Sands, MGM Resorts, and
Melco Crown Entertainment, respectively.38 These 2002 concessions are still in
effect and are set to expire in 2020; however, after the expiration of the
concessions, the concessionaires can request renewals.39
Today, the concessionaries operate thirty-six casinos in Macau: twenty by
SJM; six by Galaxy Entertainment; five by Las Vegas Sands; four by Melco
Crown Entertainment; two by Wynn Resorts; and one by MGM Resorts.40
Other legal non-casino gambling activities in Macau include pari-mutuel
(betting on greyhound racing and thoroughbred horse racing), lottery and
instant games, and sports betting, which account for a small percentage of
overall revenue.41
B. Las Vegas
Las Vegas is a city located in Clark County, Nevada, in the United States
of America.42 The State of Nevada has a history of gambling legislation marked
by many shifts between legalization and prohibition and by regulation and
deregulation.
During the 19th century, when Nevada was merely a western frontier,

See Macao Gaming History, supra note 30.
Id.
35
Id.
36
See Clarissa Chan, Gaming Tourism Trend in Macau, UNIV. OF GUELPH (Feb. 8,
2012), https://atrium.lib.uoguelph.ca/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10214/3649/Trend_
report_Macau_gaming_trend.pdf.
37
See Macao Gaming History, supra note 30.
38
Id.
39
See Chan, supra note 36.
40
See Macao Gaming History, supra note 30.
41
See id.; see also Quarterly Gaming Statistics, Gross Revenue from Different
Gaming Activities, GAMING INSPECTION & COORDINATION BUREAU,
http://www.dicj.gov.mo/web/en/information/DadosEstat/ 2015/content.html.
42
See About Clark County, CLARK COUNTY, NV (last visited Dec. 12, 2016),
http://www.clarkcountynv.gov/pages/about.aspx.
33
34
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widespread gambling occurred, particularly in mining camps.43 However, in
1861, the legislature of the Nevada territory banned all forms of gambling by
enacting the Nevada Territorial Act of 1861, which provided for criminal
penalties.44 People mostly ignored the law and continued to gamble openly,
generally in the form of faro, poker, and roulette.45 In 1864, Nevada joined the
Union and its new State Constitution did not mention gambling.46 In 1865, the
state legislature repealed the Nevada Territorial Act of 1861, but passed a new
act that upheld the ban on gambling, and only reduced the penalties for
violation.47
In 1869, the state legislature overrode the governor’s veto to pass a bill,
that legalized gambling but only provided for minimal regulation.48 Economic
factors—city and county revenues from licensing fees—played an important
role in passing the bill, as well as its several amendments.49 Indeed, when the
economy was down, support for gaming increased because it provided
necessary revenues.50 However, when the economy was buttressed by the
mining industry, people looked at gaming as a vice.51
The changing economics and sentiments toward gaming continued to keep
legalization in flux. Forty years later, the state legislature enacted a law that
again prohibited all forms of gambling, only to repeal it a year later.52 Then, in
1912, the legislature reinstated prohibition, although it was unevenly enforced
and illegal gambling establishments continued to operate in many cities.53
Finally, in 1931, the state legislature passed the last piece of legislation
regarding gambling legalization in Nevada, Assembly Bill 98, which has
provided for legal gambling in Nevada ever since.54

See RESEARCH DIV., NEV. LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL BUREAU, POLICY AND
PROGRAM REPORT, GAMING IN NEVADA 1 (2016), http://www.leg.state.nv.us/
Division/Research/Publications/PandPReport/2016PandPReport.pdf.
44
See id.; see also Ben Hetfeld, The Legislative History of Gambling, 1861–1915,
UNLV THESES, DISSERTATIONS, PROF. PAPERS, & CAPSTONES 13 (2000),
http://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1455&context=thesesdissertations.
45
See RESEARCH DIV., supra note 43, at 1–2.
46
The Nevada State Constitution did ban lotteries, but did not provide for any
punishment for its violation until the Lottery Act of 1873. See Hetfeld, supra note
44, at 15.
47
Id.
48
See RESEARCH DIV., supra note 43, at 2.
49
See Hetfeld, supra 44 at 18–20, 23, 32–36.
50
See id. at 23.
51
See id. at 33.
52
See RESEARCH DIV., supra note 43, at 2.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 2–3.
43
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C. Singapore
Singapore is a small archipelago nation measuring 268 square miles and
located off the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula in the Indian Ocean.55
Singapore banned casino gambling when it became an independent
republic in 1965; however, the country later permitted some gambling
activities.56 In 1968, Singapore’s lottery began operating and introducing
games over the next two decades.57 In 1999, Singapore began permitting sports
betting on local football games, and in 2002, the country expanded sports
betting to include international football.58 Over the course of its history, the
country has also permitted other gambling activities such as betting on horse
racing, club slot machines, and casino cruises in international waters.59
Over these decades, Singapore rejected multiple requests to change its
legal position on casino gambling.60 However, in April 2004, Singapore’s
Parliament announced that it would reconsider the ban on casinos in an effort to
boost the economy.61 The government felt that Singapore needed to reinvent
itself to regain its international competitiveness as a tourist and business
destination.62 Government officials made formal visits to other locations where
casino gaming was legal to conduct research on operations and regulations.63
In November 2005, the government issued a request for bid proposals from
interested developers.64 One year later, the government announced its approval
for two IRs, which were defined as projects with the components and amenities
for “Meetings, Incentive, Convention, and Exposition.”65 The goal was to
create resorts that would become tourist destinations in their own right.66 There
would be two locations for the new IRs: Marina Bay, a tract of land in a new
downtown zone next to Singapore’s Central Business District, and Sentosa, an
offshore island accessible from the main island by road and monorail.67
See Singapore, WORLDMARK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NATIONS, http://www.
encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/singapore0 (last visited Dec. 13, 2016).
56
See Joan C. Henderson, Developing and Regulating Casinos: The Case of
Singapore, 12 TOURISM & HOSPITALITY RES. 139, 141 (2012).
57
See Singapore Gaming Summary, UNIV. OF NEV., L. V., CTR. FOR GAMING
RESEARCH (May 7, 2014, 9:48 AM), http://gaming.unlv.edu/abstract/
singapore.html [hereinafter Singapore Gaming Summary].
58
Id.
59
See Henderson, supra note 56, at 142.
60
Id. at 141.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
See Singapore Gaming Summary, supra note 57.
65
See Henderson, supra note 56 at 141; see also Singapore Gaming Summary,
supra note 57.
66
See Singapore Gaming Summary, supra note 57.
67
See Henderson, supra note 56 at 141; see also Singapore Gaming Summary,
55
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In March 2006, the government closed its request for proposals and chose
Las Vegas Sands and Genting PLC as the IR developers and operators.68
Nearly four years later, Genting PLC developed Resorts World Sentosa, which
covers 47 hectares and cost $5.2 billion.69 A few months thereafter, Las Vegas
Sands opened Marina Bay Sands, which covers 15.5 hectares of land and cost
$5.5 billion.70 These IRs remain the only two permitted by law in Singapore.71
II. ENTRY LEVY
An entry levy is a fee a patron must pay to gain admission to a casino.
Singapore is the only gaming market discussed herein that imposes an entry
levy.72 According to the Singapore Casino Regulatory Authority (“CRA”),
“The entry levy system is one of the casino safeguard measures put in place to
protect Singaporeans [Citizens] and Permanent Residents (“SCPR”). It is meant
to remind SCPRs that gambling is an expense and not a way to make a
living.”73 Generally, the entry levy seems to affect both the rates of gambling
participation and the prevalence of gambling problems among residents.74
A. Singapore
The Casino Control Act (“CCA”) of Singapore imposes an entry levy on
SCPRs.75 The CCA provides that a casino operator shall not allow an SCPR to
enter or remain on its premises and participate in gambling activities at any
time, without paying the entry levy.76 The punishment for not paying the entry
levy or for remaining after the expiration of any paid access period includes a
criminal conviction, with a fine of up to S$1,000, plus the cost of the levy.77
The entry levy costs S$100 per twenty-four hour period of access, or
S$2,000 for an annual membership with a casino.78 The patron can pay the
entry levy in advance of his or her actual visit; however, a twenty-four hour
access entry levy expires if not used within thirty days, and an annual
supra note 57.
68
See Henderson, supra note 56 at 141; see also Singapore Gaming Summary,
supra note 57.
69
See Henderson, supra note 56 at 141.
70
Id.
71
See Casino Control Act (Cap 33A, 2007 rev. ed.) at 41(1) (Sing.) [hereinafter
CCA]; see also Singapore Gaming Summary, supra note 57.
72
See infra Section II.A.
73
See FAQ Why do I need to purchase an entry levy to enter a casino?, CASINO
REG. AUTH., http://www.ifaq.gov.sg/CRA/apps/fcd_faqmain. aspx#FAQ_33950
(Sing.).
74
See infra Section II.A.
75
See generally CCA, supra note 71, at 116.
76
Id. at 116(1).
77
Id. at 116(6).
78
Id. at 116(1).
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membership begins to run ninety days after purchase, even if the patron did not
visit any casino.79 On a monthly basis, the casinos turn over these entry levies
to the Singapore Totalisator Board, which uses the funds for social or charitable
purposes in Singapore.80
A casino operator may not pay for the entry levy for an SCPR, nor refund
or reimburse him or her for the entry levy in any manner; the operator also may
not give any right, privilege, discount, or benefit in addition to entry to the
premises for the payment of the entry levy.81 Moreover, casino operators may
not change the specified timeframes provided for prepayment, allow access
after expiration, or refund an entry levy that goes unused.82 The CRA regularly
imposes penalties on casino operators for these breaches.83
Data suggest that the entry levies are extremely effective in reducing
resident casino gambling. A 2014 study revealed that while 44% of adult
Singapore residents participated in a gambling activity in the preceding twelve
months, only 2% of this gambling took place at IRs.84 In comparison, there
were participation rates of 78% and 10% in the lottery and social gambling,
respectively.85 SCPRs also decreased their average daily visits to casinos from
20,000 visits in 2010 when the casinos opened, to 17,000 visits in 2013.86
Casino Control (Entry Levy) Regulations 2010 (GN No S 52/2010) Reg. 4(1)
(Sing.) [hereinafter CCELR].
80
CCA, supra note 71, at 116(2).
81
See CCA, supra note 71, at 116(3); see also CCELR, supra note 79, at Reg. 6.
82
CCELR, supra note 79, Reg. 4(2)–(3).
83
See Enforcement Actions, CASINO REG. AUTH., http://www.cra.gov.sg/cra/
enforcement-actions.aspx/93 (Sing.)
For example, in September 2012, the CRA imposed the highest financial
penalty to date of S$600,000 on Resorts World Sentosa for reimbursing annual
entry levies through a marketing program that gave incentives such as Universal
Studios Singapore tickets, concert tickets, and hotel accommodations to locals
when they purchased or renewed annual memberships. In its press release for the
matter, the CRA stated that the “entry levy is one of many social safeguards put in
place to address problem gaming.”
The Chief Executive of the CRA also said, “CRA is sending a clear signal to
the operator that they should comply fully with the social safeguards put in place to
protect locals. Compliance to our laws and regulations must be strictly adhered to
at all times.” In addition, in February 2012, the CRA fined both Marina Bay Sands
and Resorts World Sentosa a total of S$385,000 for allowing residents to enter
without paying the entry levies or on expired levy payments. See CRA Imposes
Fine of $600,000 on Resorts World for Reimbursing Annual Entry Levy, CASINO
REG. AUTH. (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.cra.gov.sg/cra/cra-imposes-fine-of600000-on-resorts-world-for-reimbursing-annual-entry-levy.aspx/77 (Sing.).
84
See NAT’L COUNCIL ON PROBLEM GAMBLING, REPORT OF SURVEY ON
PARTICIPATION IN GAMBLING ACTIVITIES AMONG SINGAPORE RESIDENTS, 2014 2,
9
(2015),
https://www.ncpg.org.sg/en/pdf/2014%20NCPG%20Gambling%
20Participation%20Survey_FINAL.pdf (Sing.) [hereinafter SINGAPORE GAMBLING
PARTICIPATION].
85
Id. at 9.
86
See CASINO REG. AUTH., ANNUAL REPORT (2013), http://www.cra.gov.sg/
79
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Further, only 7.7% of adult SCPRs visited casinos more than once within the
first three years of their operation.87
Singapore also has the lowest prevalence rates of gambling problems of all
the markets discussed herein. There are two tiers of gambling problems:
problem gambling and gambling disorder (formerly known as pathological
gambling), which is more severe. The American Psychiatric Association
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders includes gambling
disorder, which it classifies as an addiction,88 and provides criteria for
diagnosis.89 In 2014, an estimated 0.2% of adult Singapore residents were
likely suffering from gambling disorder.90 This represented a statistically
significant decrease from 1.4% in 2011.91 Further, an estimated 0.5% of adult
Singapore residents were probable problem gamblers.92 This represented a
statistically significant decrease from 1.2% in 2011.93
B. Las Vegas
By contrast, Nevada specifically prohibits casinos from exacting entry
levies—with certain exceptions.94 A casino licensee that does receive the
exceptional approval to charge a fee may not restrict admission to the area on

upload_files/cuteeditor/1/document/Casino%20Regulatory%20Authority%20of%2
0Singapore%20Annual%20Report%202012-2013_lr_1Oct.pdf (Sing.).
87
Id.
88
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS, § 312.31 (Am.
Psychiatric Ass’n., 5th ed.) (2013).
89
A diagnosis of gambling disorder requires the exhibition of at least four of the
following nine criteria within the last 12 months:

90

1. Needs to gamble with increasing amounts of money in order to achieve the desired
excitement.
2. Is restless or irritable when attempting to cut down or stop gambling.
3. Has made repeated unsuccessful efforts to control, cut back, or stop gambling.
4. Is often preoccupied with gambling (e.g., having persistent thoughts of reliving past
gambling experiences, handicapping or planning the next venture, thinking of ways to get
money with which to gamble).
5. Often gambles when feeling distressed (e.g., helpless, guilty, anxious, depressed).
6. After losing money gambling, often returns another day to get even (“chasing” one’s
losses).
7. Lies to conceal the extent of involvement with gambling.
8. Has jeopardized or lost a significant relationship, job, or educational or career opportunity
because of gambling.
9. Relies on others to provide money to relieve desperate financial situations caused by
gambling. See id.
See SINGAPORE GAMBLING PARTICIPATION, supra note 84, at 4.

Id.
Id.
93
Id.
94
However, a casino licensee can request approval to charge a fee from the
chairman of the Nevada Gaming Control Board by submitting a form that requires
information on thirteen points of criteria. Nev. Gaming Reg. 5.210 (2017).
91
92
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grounds of race, color, religion, national origin, or disability.95 This provision is
probably rooted in the United States Civil Rights Act of 1964 and stands in
stark contrast to the entry levy law of Singapore, which inherently permits
discrimination on national origin through residency and/or citizenship.96
Las Vegas’ rates of gambling participation and problems stand in stark
contrast to those of Singapore.97 In 2014, 54% of Clark County residents
participated in a gambling activity, as compared to only 44% in Singapore.98
However, among the participating residents, 63% gambled in Las Vegas
casinos, nearly thirty-two times the rate of Singapore residents.99 Further, 23%
of participating residents gambled in casinos at least once a week, and 61% at
least once a month.100
Nevada not only has the highest prevalence rates of gambling problems,
but also has a higher rate of the more severe gambling disorder than problem
gambling.101 The most recent study on the prevalence of problem gambling
shows that between 2.7% and 4.3% of adult Nevada residents could suffer from
gambling disorder.102 In addition, between 2.2% and 3.6% of adult Nevada
residents could be problem gamblers.103 Therefore, a combined 6.4% of adult
Nevada residents could have a gambling problem.104 This figure increases to

Id.
Id.; see generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. § 241.
97
Many citizens and residents from all over the United States gamble in Las
Vegas and may make them susceptible to its harms. However, this Article focuses
on the citizens and residents of Las Vegas, and in some cases Nevada, who have
close proximity to the casinos. This focus makes the geographic size more
comparable to smaller areas like Macau, Singapore, and Japan. Cf. LAS VEGAS
CONVENTION & VISITORS AUTH., 2016 LAS VEGAS VISITOR PROFILE 51, 57,
http://www.lvcva.com/
includes/content/images/media/docs/2016-Las-VegasVisitor-Profile.pdf, with DOCUMENTATION & INFO. CTR. OF THE STATISTICS &
CENSUS SERV., TOURISM STATISTICS 2015 107, 116 (2016) (Mac.),
http://www.dsec.gov.mo/getAttachment/471ff8d9-5a28-4fcd-85398b374dcf2c59/E_TUR_PUB_2015_Y.aspx?disposition=attachment.
98
LAS VEGAS CONVENTION & VISITORS AUTH., 2014 CLARK COUNTY RESIDENTS
STUDY 11, http://www.lvcva.com/includes/content/ images/media/docs/2014Clark_County_Resident_Study.pdf. This study does not include tourists in its
study; see supra Section II.A; SINGAPORE GAMBLING PARTICIPATION, supra note
84.
99
LAS VEGAS CONVENTION & VISITORS AUTH., supra note 98, at 24; see supra
Section II.A; SINGAPORE GAMBLING PARTICIPATION, supra note 84, at 4.
100
LAS VEGAS CONVENTION & VISITORS AUTH., supra note 98, at 24.
101
RACHEL A. VOLBERG, GAMBLING AND PROBLEM GAMBLING IN NEVADA,
REPORT TO THE NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES 32 (Mar. 22, 2002),
http://www.nevadacouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/NV-Prevalence-StudyAdults-2002.pdf.
102
Id. at 29.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 46.
95
96
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7% when looking at just adult Clark County residents.105 Interestingly, casino
gamblers had the second-lowest rate of gambling problems, at 8.7%, just
behind those who played the lottery, at 5.7%.106 Nonetheless, these estimates of
gambling problems are significantly higher than the 0.7% estimate in
Singapore.107
As a final note, Las Vegas is unique because it permits licensed gambling
activities similar to casino games in convenience and grocery stores, gas
stations, bars, and restaurants.108 Indeed, between 21% and 28% of
participating residents gamble at these locations.109 Further, gamblers that
participated in other gaming activities, such as non-casino gaming machines,
had higher gambling problem rates, ranging from 11.4% to 33.7%.110
Therefore, it is plausible that Las Vegas has higher prevalence rates because it
allows non-casino gambling, and problem gamblers frequent these locations
more often because they are far more numerous than casinos.111
C. Macau
Macau does not mandate an entry levy, nor does it prohibit a casino from
charging admission fees.112 Macau has both higher prevalence rates and
gambling participation, particularly in casino gambling, compared to
Singapore, but not Las Vegas.113
According to a 2014 study, the gambling participation rate of Macau
residents was 49.5% in 2013.114 Gambling in Macau casinos was the third most
Id. at 30.
Id. at 31.
107
See supra Section II.A; SINGAPORE GAMBLING PARTICIPATION, supra note 84,
at 4; see LAS VEGAS CONVENTION & VISITORS AUTH., supra 98 at 24.
108
See LAS VEGAS CONVENTION & VISITORS AUTH., supra note 98, at 31–32.
109
Id. at 31–32.
110
See VOLBERG, supra note 101, at 31.
111
See supra Section II.B; LAS VEGAS CONVENTION & VISITORS AUTH., supra
note 98.
112
See generally Law No. 10/2012, infra note 152.
113
See supra Sections II.A–B.
114
Inst. For The Study of Commercial Gaming, Univ. Of Mac., Report on a Study
of Macao People’s Participation in Gambling Activities 2013 (2014),
http://iasweb.ias.gov.mo/dtj/en/annualReport/dfccvf_rs2013.pdf
[hereinafter
Macau Gambling Participation].
Nearly ninety-five percent of the total visitors to Macau in 2015 came from
Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, all of which belong to China. More than
32% of these visitors did so primarily to gamble, an increase from prior years.
Although Chinese nationals from all over China gamble in Macau, as in Las Vegas,
this Article focuses only on the residents of Macau where the casinos are located.
See generally DOCUMENTATION & INFO. CTR. OF THE STATISTICS & CENSUS SERV.,
TOURISM STATISTICS 2015 107, 116 (2016) (Mac.), http://www.dsec.gov.mo/
getAttachment/471ff8d9-5a28-4fcd85398b374dcf2c59/E_TUR_PUB_2015_Y
.aspx?disposition=attachment.
105
106
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popular gambling activity amongst Macau residents with about 12%
participating, behind the lottery and social gambling.115 While casino gambling
among Macau residents pales in comparison to Las Vegas residents, it is six
times that of Singapore.116
The study also found that 1.9% of Macau residents were possible problem
gamblers.117 Further, 0.9% of Macau residents could be suffering from
gambling disorder.118 These figures represented a decline from prior years for
both possible problem gamblers and gambling disorder.119 However, the
average rates are nearly double those of Singapore, but about half those of Las
Vegas.120
Macau residents with a gambling problem participated in gambling at
Macanese casinos more frequently than any other gambling activity.121 Macao
residents who gambled in Macanese casinos were 8.6 times more likely to
become possible problem gamblers or suffer from gambling disorder than those
who did not.122 Macanese casinos likely have a much greater effect on
prevalence rates of problem gambling than Las Vegas because these are the
only locations where casino games are available, as in Singapore.
D. Recommendation for Japan
The comparison between Singapore, Las Vegas, and Macau supports the
proposition that entry levies may be effective in reducing the participation in
casino gambling amongst residents. An entry levy in Japan seems likely as
Article 13 of the Draft Act, “Admission,” states that visitors may have to pay
for admission to casino facilities.123 Japanese lawmakers previously said that
the preferred model for casino regulation in Japan is Singapore and suggested
that IRs would charge Japanese citizens and permanent residents an entry levy,
but not foreigners.124
Entry levies may be too effective in keeping locals out of casinos, even
those that are unlikely to ever become problem gamblers. Indeed, analysts
suggest that the casino market in Singapore already reached its maximum, and
because the rigid restrictions on locals is a unique issue to that market, there

See Macau Gambling Participation, supra note 114.
See supra Section II.B.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
See supra Sections II.A-B.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
See Draft Act, supra note 13, art. 13; see also Shiga & Caldwell, supra note 13,
at 2.
124
See Reynolds & Takahashi, supra note 17.
115
116
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will be a negative growth rate unless casinos tap into the local market.125 Data
suggest that the local casino gambling market in Japan has the potential to be
significant. Without casinos, the gambling participation rate in Japan is
approximately 65.6%.126 Further, the second most popular gambling activity is
pachinko, a game similar to a slot machine found in casinos, behind playing the
lottery.127
However, data also show that problem gambling is already an issue in
Japan without casinos. The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare in Japan
funded a study that showed 4.8% of the adult population might have gambling
disorder.128 Thus, the prevalence rate of gambling disorder in Japan is the
highest of all the gaming markets without the presence of casinos.129 Further,
pachinko is the first gambling choice of 77% of those suffering from gambling
disorder in Japan.130
The development of casinos in Japan is a valid cause of concern given
these rates. To effectively combat problem gambling among its citizens and
permanent residents, Japan should impose an ex ante entry levy. Although an
entry levy may alienate a portion of the market, Japan should put the welfare
and health of its citizens and permanent residents ahead of profits. Indeed, the
money collected from the entry levies could fund responsible gaming initiatives
to combat gambling addiction and problem gambling as some Japanese

See Jun Hongo, Five Million Japanese Have Gambling Problem, Says Ministry
Study, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 22, 2014, 5:52 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
japanrealtime/2014/08/22/five-million-japanese-have-gambling-problem-saysministry-study; see also Grace Leong, Luck Running Out for Singapore’s Two
Casinos?, STRAITS TIMES (Sept. 24, 2014, 1:22 AM), http://www.straitstimes.
com/news/opinion/eye-the-economy/story/luck-running-out-singapores-twocasinos-20140924; Howard Stutz, Singapore Casinos Produce $6 billion in
Gaming Revenue in 2013; Market Still Trails Las Vegas Strip, LAS VEGAS REV. J.
(Feb 21, 2014, 6:26 AM), http://www.reviewjournal.com/ business/singaporecasinos-produce-6-billion-gaming-revenue-2013-market-still-trails-las-vegas-strip.
126
See Naoko Takiguchi & Richard J. Rosenthal, Problem Gambling in Japan: A
Social Perspective, ELECTRONIC J. OF CONTEMPORARY JAPANESE STUD. (Jan. 31,
2011), http://www.japanesestudies.org.uk/articles/ 2011/Takiguchi.html (including
pachinko as a gambling activity).
127
Id. Japan permits pachinko parlors, where players rent silver balls to play the
game and attempt to win more silver balls. Pachinko does not constitute gambling
because playing the game for money is illegal and parlors cannot disburse money in
exchange for the silver balls. Instead, once a player has earned a certain amount of
silver balls, they can exchange it for a small prize like candy. The player can then
leave the parlor and exchange the prize for money somewhere else; this is a
loophole used to circumvent the ban on gambling, although it is widely recognized
that it closely resembles gambling. Pachinko remains a popular leisure activity in
Japan today, and the estimated total annual revenues from parlors are $187 billion,
the largest of any other leisure activity. See Ryan, supra note 4.
128
See Hongo, supra note 125.
129
See supra Sections II.A-C.
130
See Takiguchi & Rosenthal, supra note 126.
125

VALDEZ FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

100

UNLV GAMING LAW JOURNAL

5/30/17 2:23 PM

[Vol. 7:85

lawmakers have suggested.131 Further, the goal of the Draft Act is to improve
the economy by increasing foreign tourism rather than to legalize casino
gambling for the enjoyment of its residents.132
III. AGE RESTRICTION
Research suggests that the availability, accessibility, and exposure to
gambling are associated with gambling problems.133 Although most studies
found that gambling problems and younger age are not strongly correlated
among adults, prevalence rates among adolescents are higher than adults.134
Further, data from the markets discussed herein suggest that age restrictions
may not prevent gambling problems, but may delay their onset by limiting
access and exposure until a person reaches a certain age. All three markets
discussed herein have set the legal gambling age at twenty-one years, although
the ages of majority are set at lower ages. Further, Macau and Singapore have
lower ages to legally consume alcohol.
A. Las Vegas
Nevada sets the legal casino gambling age at twenty-one years old.135
Twenty-one years is also the legal age to consume alcohol in Nevada.136
However, the age of majority is eighteen years old.137
Specifically, any person under twenty-one years old may not play, place
wagers at, or collect winnings from any type of gaming activity, by himself or
through an agent, nor loiter in any place where licensed gaming activities
occur.138 In addition, a person under twenty-one years old may not be a gaming
employee, other than in a counting room.139
This age restriction correlates with the average age that adult Nevada
residents start gambling. On average, non-problem gamblers begin gambling at
twenty-four years old, compared to twenty-two for problem gamblers.140 Thus,
problem gamblers tend to start gambling earlier than non-problem gamblers,

See Entry Levy on Foreigners Mooted for Japan Casinos, GGRASIA (June 18,
2014), http://www.ggrasia.com/entry-levy-on-foreigners-mooted-for-japan-casinos.
132
See supra Part II.
133
See Hellen Miller, Risk Factors for Problem Gambling, VICTORIAN
RESPONSIBLE GAMBLING FOUND. (May 2015), http://www.responsiblegambling.
vic.gov.au/__data/ assets/pdf_file/0014/20255/Risk-factors-for-problem-gamblingweb.pdf.
134
Id. at 8, 10.
135
NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.350 (2017).
136
Id. § 202.020.
137
Id. § 129.010.
138
Id. § 463.350.
139
Id.
140
See VOLBERG, supra note 101, at 36.
131
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though the average ages for both groups are over the legal age. This suggests
that the age restriction is effective in delaying participation in gambling
activities and the onset of problem gambling.
Any person who violates or permits the violation of this age restriction, be
it a licensee, employee, dealer, or other person, is guilty of a misdemeanor.141
Someone prosecuted for the violation of the age restriction may not use as a
defense that he or she believed the person was at least twenty-one years old.142
It is also a misdemeanor for a person to use false identification in order to enter
or gamble in a gambling establishment.143
B. Singapore
Singapore has also set the legal casino gambling age at twenty-one years
old, but sets the legal age for all other forms of gambling at eighteen.144
Twenty-one years old is also the age of majority, but the legal age to consume
alcohol is eighteen.145
Data on Singapore residents also suggest a correlation between the legal
gambling age, the average age at which residents first participate in gambling,
and the average age at which these residents begin to gamble regularly—
though not conclusively. According to the 2014 study, 42% of Singapore
residents first participated in gambling between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-four years old.146 Further, this was the age range at which about a third
of both non-problem and problem gamblers began regularly gambling.147
However, another third of both non-problem and problem gamblers began
regularly gambling between the ages of thirty and thirty-nine years old, and
another fifth began regularly gambling between twenty-five and twenty-nine
years old.148 Therefore, evidence from Singapore residents reveals that,
although there may be a correlation between age and gambling problems, there
is not a clear age at which a restriction would prevent or delay development.
A minor that violates the Singapore age provision is subject to a criminal
conviction and fine up to $1,000.149 Likewise, a casino operator may be subject
NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.350 (2017).
Id.
143
Id. § 205.460.
144
See CCA, supra note 71, §§ 130, 132(1); Singapore Totalisator Board Act (Ch.
305A, 2012 Rev. Ed.) §15(b) (Sing.).
145
The age of majority in Singapore is the age at which one can enter into a
binding contract, which is eighteen years old for most contracts. See Civil Law Act
(Ch. 43, 1999 Rev. Ed.), §§ 35–36 (Sing.) (specifying 21 years old as the legal age
for contracts involving land and property); Customs Act: Customs (Liquor
Licensing) Regulations 2009 (Ch. 70, Rg. 3, 2009 Rev. Ed.), §§ 29(2)–(4) (Sing.).
146
SINGAPORE GAMBLING PARTICIPATION, supra note 84, at 10.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
CCA, supra note 71, § 132(2).
141
142
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to disciplinary action if it permits a minor to enter or remain on the premises
without a reasonable excuse.150 Casino operators can defend themselves from
liability by showing that the minor who illicitly gambled was at least sixteen
years old and provided false identification and claimed to be twenty-one years
old.151
C. Macau
In 2012, Macau changed its age restriction on casino gambling and entry
from eighteen to twenty-one years of age for residents.152 Further, casinos may
only employ those who are at least twenty-one years old.153 In contrast, the
ages of majority and for the purchase or consumption of alcohol in Macau is
eighteen and sixteen years old, respectively.154
Similar to Las Vegas, though not as strongly as in Singapore, there may be
a correlation between gambling participation and the legal age. According to
the 2014 study, almost half of Macau residents that participate in gambling
activities are between the ages twenty-two and twenty-nine.155 Thus, most
gambling participants in Macau are above the legal age for both casino
gambling and non-casino gambling. However, some underage gambling does
take place, as 27% of Macau residents between the ages of fifteen and twentyone years old participate in gambling activities.156
Like in Las Vegas, casino operators bear the burden of enforcing the age
restriction.157 Those under the age of twenty-one years old who violate the
provision are subject to fines.158 Moreover, the government of Macau, instead
of the underage player, collects any illicit gambling winnings.159
D. Recommendation for Japan
Like in Las Vegas, Singapore, and Macau, Japan should impose an age

Id. § 133(1), (3).
Id. §§ 133(5), 136.
152
See Lei n.º 10/2012, Artigo 2 Interdição de entrada nos casinos [Law 10/2012,
art. 2 Entry ban on casinos] (2012) (Mac.), http://bo.io.gov.mo/
bo/i/2012/35/lei10.asp [hereinafter Law No. 10/2012].
153
Id. at Artigo 3 § 1.
154
Jorge Godinho, Casino Gaming in Macau: Evolution, Regulation and
Challenges, 5 UNLV GAMING L. J. 1, 18 (2014); David J. Hanson, Minimum Legal
Drinking Ages Around the World, ALCOHOL: PROBLEMS & SOLUTIONS,
https://www.alcoholproblemsandsolutions.org/ LegalDrinkingAge.html (last visited
Mar. 23, 2017).
155
Macau Gambling Participation, supra note 114.
156
Id. The study includes eighteen to twenty-one year olds in this age range
making it unclear what proportion is underage gambling.
157
Law No. 10/2012, supra note 152, at Ch. II, art. 13 § 2(2).
158
Id. at Ch. II, art. 13 § 1(1).
159
Id. at Ch. II, art. 11 § 1.
150
151
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restriction on the entry into, and participation in, casino gambling. The age
restriction will delay access to casino gambling, and likely to the development
of a gambling problem in certain individuals. Although a higher age
requirement will increase the delay, the age must be reasonable.
Japan should set the legal gambling age at twenty years old to comport
with the ages of majority and consumption of alcohol—both also twenty. This
age restriction is not only consistent in form, but also in purpose. Adults are
better able to understand the risks and harmful consequences of gambling and
thus can make informed decisions about whether to gamble. The age restriction
will also protect the more susceptible adolescents from developing a gambling
problem. In addition, the consumption of alcohol can lead to addiction, and
harmful consequences to the individual and society, just as with problem
gambling or gambling disorder. To allow for the consumption of alcohol, but
not gambling, seems arbitrary.
Casinos are in the best position to enforce the age requirement and should
bear the burden of enforcement. The privilege of operating a casino provides
them with great financial resources to implement enforcement mechanisms, and
curtails the diversion of limited public resources and law enforcement. Further,
the gambling takes place on casinos’ premises, which casinos secure and
maintain control. Casinos should be subject to disciplinary action for
negligently enforcing the age requirement. Discipline of casinos should depend
on frequency or egregiousness of the violation, and should include substantial
fines, increased oversight of internal controls, and suspension or revocation of
gaming licenses.
Underage patrons should be subject to only minimal criminal liability for
violating the age restriction. Although underage gambling is potentially
harmful to the patron, a criminal record may be even more detrimental to his or
her welfare in scope and duration. A violation should result in an infraction, not
a misdemeanor or felony, and punishment should include a substantial fine.
However, if an underage patron continues to violate the restriction, punishment
should increase with each infraction.
IV. EXCLUSION
Apart from age restrictions, governments may invoke other considerations
to keep its residents and visitors out of casinos. This entails excluding an
individual from a casino and removing his or her opportunity to gamble there.
There are two types of exclusion: self-exclusion and third-party exclusion.
Exclusion can address problem gambling both proactively and retroactively.
Depending on the type of exclusion, it can either aid in the prevention of
problem gambling, mitigate the harm from problem gambling, or both.
Singapore and Macau have more comprehensive exclusion regulations than Las
Vegas.
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A. Singapore
The CCA provides for three types of exclusion from casinos: voluntary
self-exclusion, family exclusion, and third party exclusion.160
Voluntary self-exclusion allows a casino patron, including SCPRs and
foreigners, to submit an application to the Singapore National Council on
Problem Gambling (NCPG) requesting his or her exclusion from entering or
participating in any gambling activities on casino premises.161 Self-exclusion
remains in effect until the patron submits another application for revocation and
the NCPG approves that application.162 The NCPG may condition the
revocation approval upon the excluded person’s participation in a counseling,
rehabilitation, or educational program, or upon consent to an assessment of
harm from gambling.163 A casino patron, but only one who is an SCPR, can
also apply for a less strict form of exclusion, which sets a maximum number of
visits permitted in a month—subject to the same revocation procedures as an
outright ban.164 As of September 2016, there were 267,426 active selfexclusions, although only about 8% of those were SCPRs.165 There were 1,465
active voluntary visit limits, all of which were SCPRs.166
A family member can also seek exclusion of an individual for a specified
period by filing an application with the NCPG.167 The NCPG will grant an
application if, after a hearing, it determines that 1) the patron may cause serious
harm to his or her family by gambling, 2) exclusion is appropriate and is in the
best interest of the patron and his or her family, and 3) the patron has had the
opportunity to respond.168 However, at the family’s request, the NCPG may
also grant a provisional exclusion order, without providing the patron with
notice or a hearing, if it finds that the patron has already caused serious harm to
his or her family and that further harm is imminent.169 The NCPG may refer the
patron to a counseling, rehabilitation, or educational program, and require the

CCA, supra note 71, §§ 159(1), 160, 161.
Id. § 163(2)(b).
162
Id. § 164(5).
163
Id. § 163(2)(a).
164
Id. §§ 165(1)–(2); see also Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) Casino Visit
Limits, NAT’L COUNCIL ON PROBLEM GAMBLING (last visited on Dec. 8, 2016),
http://www.ncpg.org.sg/en/Pages/vlfaq.aspx [hereinafter Casino Visit Limits
FAQs].
165
Update of Statistics: Active Casino Exclusions & Visitation Limits, NAT’L
COUNCIL ON PROBLEM GAMBLING 1, 2 (Sept. 30, 2016), http://www.ncpg.org.sg/
en/pdf/Exclusion%20and%20Visit%20Limit%20Statistics%20for%20Media%20R
elease%20(as%20at%2030%20September%202016).pdf [hereinafter EXCLUSION
STATISTICS].
166
Id.
167
CCA, supra note 71, §§ 159(1)–(2), 163(1).
168
Id. §§ 162(1)(a)–(c).
169
See id. § 164(1).
160
161
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closure of any deposit accounts held with a casino.170 As a less drastic measure,
a family member can also apply for a limitation on a patron’s monthly visits.171
As of September 2016, there were 2,284 active family exclusions and 10 active
family visit limits.172
Singapore also provides for additional third-party exclusion mechanisms,
as laid out in the CCA. First, a national default rule automatically excludes
from casinos any person who receives social assistance or a subsidy through
any Singapore government program, or any person with an undischarged
bankruptcy.173 As of September 2016, there were 47,254 active automatic
exclusions.174 Moreover, the NCPG may exclude someone from casinos, if it
finds that individual has a poor credit record or is otherwise vulnerable to
financial harm due to gambling.175 In addition, with or without the patron’s
request, casino operators themselves may issue or revoke written exclusion
orders—and must provide notification of doing so to the NCPG and CRA.176
The CRA, too, may issue or revoke an exclusion order, orally or in writing, but
must notify the casino operators upon doing so; however, oral exclusion orders
automatically terminate fourteen days after issuance.177 Lastly, the
Commissioner of Police may issue or revoke written exclusion orders, provided
that the Commissioner of Police notify the NCPG and casino operators, and
that the order is subject to appeal by the excluded person to the Minister for
Home Affairs.178 An order issued by the CRA and the Commissioner of Police
is effective until it is affirmatively revoked, it lapses, or is revoked by the
Minister for Home Affairs on appeal.179
The NCPG keeps an updated list of all persons excluded under any of the
above means and provides the list to the CRA, the Commissioner of Police, and
all casino operators.180
B. Macau
The Macanese Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau (DICJ)
established a system of voluntary self-exclusion and third party exclusion from
casinos in 2012.181

170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181

Id. §§ 163(2)(a), (d).
Id. § 163(1)(a).
EXCLUSION STATISTICS, supra note 165, at 2.
CCA, supra note 71, §§ 165(1)(a)–(b).
EXCLUSION STATISTICS, supra note 165, at 2.
CCA, supra note 71, § 165(1)(c).
Id. §§ 120(1), (3).
Id. §§ 121(1)–(3).
Id. §§ 122(1)–(3).
Id. § 123(1).
Id. §§ 168(a)–(d).
See Law No. 10/2012, supra note 152, at Ch. I, art. 6.
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Any individual, resident or not, can apply for exclusion from all or some
casinos for themselves with no conditions. By contrast, only a spouse, parent,
child, or sibling can seek third party exclusion, and the excluded person must
personally sign the exclusion application.182 Individuals can apply, in person, at
the DICJ office with proper identification; third party applicants must come
with a recent photo of the person that they seek to exclude.183 Individuals can
also apply for exclusion through casinos, after which the DICJ will contact the
applicant to confirm his or her personal information.184 Lastly, the excluded
person can also choose whether they want to receive counseling for problem
gaming.185
Within five working days of the application, the DICJ will notify the
applicant of its approval and provide official dates of exclusion, which typically
last for two years and automatically expire.186 Once the exclusion takes effect,
the subject may not enter specified casinos.187
Only the excluded person can apply for revocation of the exclusion, in
person at the DICJ office; if approved, the revocation goes into effect thirty
days thereafter.188 After the exclusion period terminates, due to either
revocation or expiration, the subject may apply for an extension—following the
same process as an initial application.189
A violation by the excluded person constitutes a crime of simple
disobedience.190 Casinos that commit a violation by allowing an excluded
person to gamble, even with mere negligence, are subject to fines.191
C. Las Vegas
Nevada does not mandate a system of voluntary casino self-exclusion in
the manner that Singapore and Macau do.192 Instead, Nevada strictly regulates
casinos that issue credit, cash checks, or market gaming opportunities by direct

Isolation from Casinos, GAMING INSPECTION & COORDINATION BUREAU
MACAO SAR,
http://www.dicj.gov.mo/web/en/responsible/isolation/isolation.
html#2 (last visited Mar. 3, 2017).
183
Id.
184
Id.
185
Id.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Law No. 10/2012, supra note 152, at Ch. II, art. 13 § 2(2).
192
Although not required by statute or regulation, some casino operators have
taken the initiative to provide self-exclusion programs like those in Macau and
Singapore. See generally Caesars Entertainment’s Commitment to Responsible
Gaming, CAESARS ENTM’T, http://caesarscorporate.com/about-caesars/responsiblegaming (last visited Dec. 13, 2016).
182

VALDEZ FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

Summer 2017]

5/30/17 2:23 PM

EX ANTE UP

107

mail.193 The state requires that these casinos implement programs that allow
patrons to “self-limit” their access to these services but not casino gambling
itself.194 Further, the casinos must inform patrons that these programs exist,
provide patrons with written opportunities to participate, and establish
procedures and forms that require self-limited individuals to notify the casino
within ten days of the receipt of any financial gaming privilege, material, or
promotion.195
Although individuals may not exclude themselves or their loved ones, the
Nevada Gaming Commission (NGC) reserves the power to exclude or eject
individuals from gaming establishments by adding them to a state exclusion
list.196 This type of third-party exclusion only applies to gaming establishments
that conduct pari-mutuel wagering or operate any race book, sports pool or
games; it does not apply to establishments that operate only slot machines.197
Most casinos in Nevada feature more gambling activities than simply slot
machines, and thus the exclusion power applies to them.198
However, this mechanism seemingly aims to protect casinos and the
gaming industry rather than patrons because the NGC adds a person to this
exclusion list only if the NGC determines his or her presence in a gaming
establishment poses a threat to the interests of the state, to licensed gaming, or
to both.199 In making this determination, the NGC and Gaming Control Board
may consider: (1) prior felony convictions, convictions of crimes involving
moral turpitude, and/or violations of the gaming laws of any state; (2) violation
or conspiracy to violate the Nevada Gaming Control Act by failing to disclose
an interest in a gaming establishment, or willfully evading fees or taxes; (3) a
notorious reputation that may suggest to the public that the gaming industry is
not free from crime or corruption; and (4) orders from any governmental
agency which authorizes the exclusion from a gaming establishment described
above.200 These criteria clearly focus on the potential harm to the casino
industry by patrons rather than the patrons’ potential harm from gambling.
The Gaming Control Board must provide notice to any person placed on
the exclusion list.201 The excluded person may request a hearing to challenge
the exclusion within thirty or sixty days of receiving notice, depending on the
type of notice given.202 The NGC must hold the hearing within thirty days
Nev. Gaming Reg. § 5.170(4) (2017).
Id.
195
Id.
196
NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.151 (2017).
197
Id.
198
Grocery stores and gas stations operate only slot machines, so exclusion is not
available for these locations. See id.
199
Id.
200
Id.
201
NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.152 (2017).
202
NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.153(1) (2017).
193
194
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thereafter.203 If the excluded person fails to timely request a hearing, or if the
NGC determines that the exclusion was proper, he or she may petition for
judicial review.204
A casino that knowingly fails to exclude or eject a person on the list may
be subject to penalties.205 An excluded person who enters a gaming
establishment is guilty of a gross misdemeanor.206
D. Recommendation for Japan
Japan should include an ex ante regulation establishing a system of selfexclusion and third party exclusion. These regulations should mirror those of
Singapore and Macau, and primarily aim to protect casino patrons rather than
the casinos and the gaming industry.
Voluntary self-exclusion may prevent problem gambling and associated
harms, if made available prior to the establishment of casinos. Those who feel
susceptible to addiction or recognize that they are not in the financial position
to participate in casino gambling may protect themselves by applying for
exclusion before being faced with the gambling temptation. In addition, selfexclusion may mitigate potential harm for those Japanese residents who are
already problem gamblers. The procedure for obtaining voluntary selfexclusion should not be lengthy or complicated otherwise it may discourage
people from starting or completing the process.
Moreover, immediate family members should be able to obtain third party
exclusion on behalf of the patron. Although people should have free choice to
engage in legal, albeit potentially harmful activity, those in need may not seek
out help of their own accord or may do so only when they have already
incurred significant harm.207 In these instances, immediate family members
may be in the position to recognize a problem and seek exclusion. Further,
immediate family members may suffer their own harm because of the gambling
of their relative. However, the excluded person should have the opportunity to
object and to be heard by an authority before the approval of an exclusion
application, so as to comport with notions of due process, as in Singapore.
Japanese government authorities and casino operators themselves should
also be able to exclude patrons, though only after providing the patron to
formally object—as in both Singapore and Las Vegas. In addition, Japan
should exclude, by default, anyone who receives government aid or social

Id.
Id.
205
NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.154 (2017).
206
NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.155 (2017).
207
For example, in Nevada, although 51.2% of problem gamblers felt nervous
about their gambling, only 7% had ever sought help for their gambling problem,
compared to non-problem gamblers with 18.1% and 0.3%, respectively. See
VOLBERG, supra note 101, at 36, 38.
203
204
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welfare, has an undischarged bankruptcy, or has any unresolved financial liens
or judgments. These individuals are not in the financial position to participate
in gambling, nor should they be using public or encumbered funds for
gambling purposes.
Exclusion periods should last at least one year, during which time the
excluded person must participate in a counseling or treatment program for
problem gambling. Such programs should be free of charge and available to
both excluded and non-excluded persons, and funded by taxes or fees on the
IRs and their entry levies. Revocations should not be easy to obtain and should
require a hearing to assess whether revocation is appropriate. Hearings should
not occur within at least thirty days of the grant of the exclusion order to
prevent unhealthy impulse decisions.
Casino operators should bear the burden of enforcing these exclusions and
limitations for the same reason as enforcing the age restriction. An electronic
system, similar to that used to verify the age information and authenticity of a
government issued ID, could quickly verify that the person is not on an
exclusion list. Casino operators that negligently violate this regulation by
permitting an excluded person to enter its premises should be subject to
substantial fines.
Japan should also provide for formally imposed limitations, including on
the number of visits per month or the amount of money with which to gamble.
However, the penalties for exceeding these limitations and the requirement to
participate in mandatory counseling or treatment should be less severe and
demanding than those involving total exclusion.
V. EXTENSION OF GAMBLING CREDIT
The extension of gambling credit allows patrons to borrow money with
which to gamble instead of using their own funds. Gambling credit is an area of
concern because patrons incur these debts specifically to gamble, which may
lead to other financial and social harms. These social harms may especially
threaten problem gamblers because they spend more money on gambling than
non-problem gamblers. Las Vegas, Singapore, and Macau permit the extension
of gambling credit, though with vastly different regulations.
A. Singapore
Singapore regulates the extension of casino credit to SCPRs more strictly
than to foreign gamblers. This policy is sensible because those suffering from
gambling disorder in Singapore bet, on average, approximately 4.5 times the
amount than regular gamblers.208
The CCA states that casino operators may only provide gambling chips on

208

See SINGAPORE GAMBLING PARTICIPATION, supra note 84, at 14.
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credit to patrons who are not SCPRs, to patrons who are premium players, or to
licensed international market agents.209 International market agents may also
only provide chips on credit to a person that is not an SCPR.210
The CCA defines a premium player as a patron who opens a deposit
account with the casino operator and deposits at least S$100,000 to use in the
casino.211 Once the patron makes the initial deposit, he or she remains a
premium player for twelve months; however, the patron ceases to be a premium
player if the account falls below S$100,000 for a continuous twelve months.212
This patron’s premium player status renews whenever he or she deposits
additional money and the account again reaches S$100,000.213
Both foreign gamblers and SCPRs can become premium players; however,
the CCA provides different regulations accordingly.214 Casino operators and
international market agents can grant credit to foreign patrons to meet the
deposit to become a premium player, but may not do so for SCPRs.215 Premium
players that are SCPRs can only obtain chips on credit if: (1) he or she registers
and qualifies for a credit program with the casino operator; (2) his or her
creditworthiness satisfies the casino operator’s credit policies, procedures, and
controls; and (3) he or she draws from a deposit account and gambles with at
least S$100,000, excluding winnings.216 Casino operators may continue to grant
an SCPR credit without requiring re-registration, if he or she remains a
premium player at all times.217
If a casino operator violates any of these provisions, it is subject to
disciplinary action, including cancellation or suspension of its casino license,
censure, variation to the terms of its casino license, and/or financial
penalties.218 An SCPR who attempts to obtain chips on credit by falsely
representing themselves as a foreign patron is guilty of a criminal offense and
subject to twelve months imprisonment and a S$10,000 fine.219 Gambling debt
is a civil issue and is enforceable in civil courts.220

CCA, supra note 71, §§ 108(7)(a), (b).
Id.
211
Id. § 2(1).
212
Casino Control Act (Ch. 33A, 2013 Rev Ed) Casino Control (Credit)
(Amendment) § 61, at 3, http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol/download/0/0/pdf/binaryFile/
pdfFile.pdf?CompId:9aacc728-1b8d-441c-b57e-3406b62c6d65 (Sing.) [hereinafter
CCCR].
213
Id. at 3–4.
214
Id. at 4.
215
Id. at 2.
216
Id. at 6.
217
Id. at 7.
218
CCA, supra note 71, §§ 54(1)(a)–(d).
219
CCCR, supra note 212, at 11.
220
See CCA, supra note 71, §§ 40(c), 108(1); but see Civil Law Act, supra note
145, §§ 5(1)–(2), (6).
209
210
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B. Macau
China has strict control over its currency, permitting Chinese individuals to
take only a limited amount of money, approximately USD $3,300, overseas
each day.221 Thus, gamblers from Mainland China cannot enter Macau with
more than that amount of money, and are limited to that amount, less all other
expenses, with which to gamble. There are both legal and illegal means to
circumvent this limitation, some of which closely resemble, or are indeed,
illegal money laundering.222
One legal alternative comes from authorized gambling credit, which makes
up a large portion of Macau’s gross gaming revenue.223 Before 2004, all
gambling credit was illegal as the crime of usury for gaming.224 However, in
July 2004, the Gaming Credit Law became effective, legalizing and regulating
gambling credit in Macau.225 The law authorizes only three types of gambling
creditor-borrower relationships: a concessionaire or sub-concessionaire as
grantor and an individual patron as borrower; an authorized gaming promoter—
similar to an international market agent in Singapore—as grantor and an
individual patron as borrower; and a concessionaire or sub-concessionaire as
grantor and an authorized gaming promoter as borrower.226 The Macanese
government regulates authorized gaming promoters by requiring them to obtain
a license.227
Grantors may not grant credit through third parties, effectively prohibiting
the assignment or transfer of their permission.228 The Gaming Credit Law sets
an interest rate, if one is not otherwise stipulated, and also limits any interest
amount to no greater than three times the set legal rate.229 Further, the penalty
rate in the event of a default is usurious if it exceeds five times the legal rate.230
Gambling credit debts are legally enforceable as civil debt in both Macau

Frank Langfitt, China’s Corruption Crackdown Pummels Macau Casinos, NPR
(Nov. 7, 2014, 3:36 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2014/11/07/
360177247/china-s-corruption-crackdown-pummels-macau-casinos.
222
Id.
223
Godinho, supra note 154 at 6.
224
Id.
225
See id.; see also Lei n.º 5/2004, Artigo 3 Concedentes de credito [Law 5/2004,
art. 3 Credit Grantors] (2004) (Mac.), http://bo.io.gov.mo/ bo/i/2004/24/lei05.asp
[hereinafter Law No. 5/2004].
226
Id., art. 3 § 1(6).
227
Id., art. 3 § 2; see also Lei n. º 6/2002, Artigo 6 Condições de acesso à
actividade [Law 6/2002, art. 6 Conditions of Access to the Activity] (2002) (Mac.),
http://dicj.gov.mo/web/pt/legislation/FortunaAzar/regAdem_ 02_006.html.
228
Id., art. 5.
229
See id.; see also Código Civil de Macao Artigo 1073 Usura [Civil Code of
Macau, art. 1073 Usury] (1999) (Mac.), http://bo.io.gov.mo/bo/i/99/31/
codcivpt/codciv1001.asp [hereinafter Civil Code of Macau].
230
Civil Code of Macau, supra note 229, art. 1073 § 2.
221
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and Hong Kong; however, they are not enforceable in Mainland China.231 Thus,
gamblers from Macau are exposed to financial harm if they are not able to pay
gambling debts. This is a cause of concern given that Macau residents gambled
the most amount of money in Macanese casinos compared to the amounts
gambled in other activities.232 Indeed, the average monthly amount gambled in
Macanese casinos was eight times higher than that of the lottery.233
C. Las Vegas
Casinos in Las Vegas extend credit to gamblers for use in their casinos,
commonly called “markers.”234 Markers are similar to interest-free loans that
require repayment at a future time.235 Casinos use credit as a marketing strategy
to attract more patrons to gamble at their establishment.236 Nearly 40% of all
wagers are made through markers.237 Further, 30% of resident gamblers
maintain casino credit.238
A patron seeking a marker from a casino must first submit an application
similar to that required for a personal loan.239 These applications ensure that he
or she is in the financial position to repay the marker.240 Subsequent markers
are easier to obtain and patrons typically receive them without going through
the initial application process, especially if he or she has a good history of
repayment with the casino.241 Casino hosts may also approve a requested
marker without requiring much paperwork.242 These hosts may be more willing
to approve a marker because their compensation includes a portion of the
patron’s losses resulting from that marker.243
To maintain a pleasant relationship with patrons who have markers,
casinos allow lengthy periods before repayment—even several months.244
Markers can grow to be several hundreds of thousands of dollars before they
come due.245 Because these markers are interest-free, the casino takes a risk of

Godinho, supra note 154, at 6.
Macau Gambling Participation, supra note 114.
233
Id.
234
Casinos
and
Debt
Collection,
STOPPREDATORYGAMBLING.ORG,
http://stoppredatorygambling.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/SPG-MemoCasinos-and-Debt-Collection-notes.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2015).
235
Id.
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
LAS VEGAS CONVENTION & VISITORS AUTH., supra note 98, at 4.
239
Casinos and Debt Collection, supra note 234.
240
Id.
241
Id.
242
Id.
243
Id.
244
Id.
245
Id.
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loss if the patron does not pay the marker.246 Indeed, casinos write off millions
of dollars every year as uncollectible debts.247
Markers are also risky for the individual patron if he or she is unable to pay
them. Under Nevada law, if the patron does not pay the marker, a casino can
file a claim with the Clark County District Attorney’s Office to prosecute
because this is theoretically equivalent to the crime of writing a bad check.248
Nevada is the only market discussed herein, and the only state in the Union,
that imposes both civil and criminal penalties on patrons who do not pay their
casino debts.249 If the amount of money is $650 or less, it constitutes a
misdemeanor offense; if the amount is more than $650, it is a category D
felony.250
Casinos frequently refer patrons with unpaid debts to the District Attorney
because, in addition to criminal punishment, the patron must also pay
restitution.251 Essentially, this process makes the District Attorney, using public
resources, the casino’s debt collector of private funds.252 The District Attorney
also receives collection fees, providing an incentive to prosecute.253
Alternatively, the casinos may file a civil claim against the patron if the district
attorney chooses not to prosecute or if that process will be too lengthy.254
D. Recommendation for Japan
Japan should prohibit the extension of gambling credit ex ante, at least to
its citizens and permanent residents. Although the three comparative markets
here permit this practice, there are strong arguments against it.
First, extending credit puts a patron in a leveraged financial position in
order to participate in gambling. The risk of loss or default is high given that
the odds of winning are ultimately against the borrower. Someone who cannot
afford exposure to losses from his or her current assets, or does not feel
comfortable losing those current assets, should not incur an additional liability
from which to lose instead. This is especially important for problem gamblers
who are willing to withstand higher losses.255
Id.
Id.
248
Id.
249
Id.
250
NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.130 (2017).
251
Casinos and Debt Collection, supra note 234.
252
Id.
253
Id.
254
Id.
255
In Nevada, problem gamblers were more likely to lose larger amounts of money
both daily and annually than non-problem gamblers. For example, 69.8% of
problem gamblers lost $1,000 or more in a single year, compared to 25.8% of nonproblem gamblers. Further, 38.6% of problem gamblers lost $1,000 or more in a
single day, compared to only 9.3% of non-problem gamblers. See VOLBERG, supra
246
247
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Second, granting credit can become predatory: casinos might become eager
to extend easy credit to patrons with poor credit in order to attract them to play
at their establishment; unregulated interest rates may be usurious; and the terms
of repayment may be uncertain or spawn defaults. Further, incentivizing credit
extension by paying commission on the losses of those borrowers, as in Las
Vegas, heightens these concerns.
Third, casinos should not extend credit because of the risk of default and
the potential losses that they will have to write down as uncollectible debt.
Although the gambling debts of citizens and permanent residents will likely be
enforceable within Japan, they may not be enforceable in other countries from
which patrons come, especially China.
If, despite these policy considerations, Japan permits the extension of
gambling credit, then it should use Singapore as the model. Regulations should
require citizens and permanent residents to prove that they are financially stable
through a deposit account and to demonstrate that they can risk loss by drawing
down the full amount in the account for gambling. However, gamblers should
have to maintain some premium player status by keeping a certain amount in an
account. There should also be a thorough credit screening procedure to ensure
creditworthiness of the borrower. Further, Japan should enforce gambling debt
under the civil code and not the criminal code.
VI. CONCLUSION
Macau, Las Vegas, and Singapore, as well as many other gaming markets,
have reaped the economic rewards of booming casino industries. Japan has the
potential to do the same and become a leading gaming market in the world if it
legalizes casino gambling. However, most legal and business propositions,
especially those that present a profound change, involve a great deal of risk.
Some risks are immediate and some risks present themselves over time. The
already high prevalence of gambling problems is one that Japan faces
immediately, even before the establishment of casinos. Further, problem
gambling and its associated harms have the potential to increase and burden
Japanese society for long after the establishment of casinos.
Japanese lawmakers must carefully consider regulations to implement at
the outset of legalization, or ex ante, in order to effectively combat problem
gambling and its harm. Japanese lawmakers can justify implementing ex ante
regulations by looking at the existing regulations of the top gaming markets in
the world. These markets have already served as the laboratories of casino
regulation, providing not only regulatory frameworks, but also data of the
results these markets have had. This Article recommends to Japanese
lawmakers regulations to implement ex ante based on this valuable
information.

note 101, at 37.
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Lastly, while ex ante regulations are crucial in combatting problem
gambling and its harms, ex post regulations may be even more important. As
Macau, Las Vegas, and Singapore have all learned, there are inevitable social,
economic, and political changes that demand the same of existing regulations.
To continue to be effective, Japanese lawmakers must amend or repeal these
regulations, as well as enact new regulations, in response changing
circumstances. However, Japan should always prioritize the health and welfare
of its citizens and residents in its regulatory decisions, rather than purely
economic pursuits.

